Compared to traditional online maps, crowdsourced maps such as Waze are unique in providing real-time updates on traffic, congestion, accidents and points of interest. In this paper, we explore the practical impact of attacks against crowdsourced map systems, and develop robust defenses against them. Our experiments show that a single attacker with limited resources can cause havoc on Waze, reporting false congestion and accidents and automatically rerouting user traffic. We describe techniques to emulate Waze-enabled vehicles using lightweight scripts, and how to use these "ghost riders" to compromise user privacy by remotely tracking precise user movements while avoiding detection. A single attacker can control groups of ghost riders, overwhelming data from legitimate users and magnifying the impact of attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing is indispensable as a real-time data gathering tool for today's online services, particularly online map services such as Google Maps or Apple Maps. For example, both Google Maps and Waze use periodic GPS readings from mobile devices to infer the speed of movement and congestion levels on streets and highways. Waze, the latest entry to the geographic map/navigation space, is designed to offer users more active ways to share information, such as notifications of accidents, police cars, and even contribute content like editing roads, landmarks, and even local fuel prices. This and the ability to interact with nearby users made Waze extremely popular, with estimated 50 million users by June 2013, when it was acquired by Google for a reported $1.3 million USD. Already, Google has begun to integrate crowdsourced data from Waze into its own Maps application, starting with accident reports.
Systems relying on crowdsourced data are inherently vulnerable to mischievous or malicious users seeking to disrupt or game the system [41] . For example, business owners can badmouth their competitors by contributing false negative reviews on Yelp or TripAdvisor, and FourSquare users can forge their physical locations to gain mayorships or discounts [11, 51] . This is exacerbated by the fact that there are no widely deployed techniques to authenticate the location of mobile devices. In fact, even authenticating the origin of traffic requests as real mobile devices is still an open problem. Under these conditions, crowdsourced services like Waze face a number of security vulnerabilities. This paper explores the practical impact of possible attacks against crowdsourced map systems such as Waze, and develops valid defenses against them. Our experiments reveal a number of potential attacks, starting with the simple event forgery attack, where one or more devices can report fake events to the Waze server, including congestion, accidents or police activity that might affect user routing in Waze. However, our work also reveals mechanisms that enable a Sybil attack [16] on crowdsourced map systems, where lightweight scripts effectively emulate a large number of virtual vehicles ("ghost riders") that collude under the control of a single attacker. These Sybils can effectively magnify the efficacy of any attack, and overwhelm contributions from any legitimate users. Finally, and most importantly, we discover a significant attack against the privacy of individual users, where ghost riders can silently "follow" individual Waze users throughout their movements, precisely mapping out their movements and visits to work, stores, hotels, gas station, and even home. We experimentally confirmed the accuracy of this attack against our own vehicles, quantifying the accuracy of the attack against GPS coordinates. Magnified by an army of ghost riders, an attacker can potentially track the constant whereabouts of millions of users, all without any risk of detection 1 . While prior art has proposed a number of solutions to the problem of location authentication, most are impractical because they rely on widespread deployment of specialized hardware, either as part of physical infrastructure, i.e. cellular base stations, or as modifications to mobile devices themselves. Instead, we propose a practical solution that limits the ability of Sybil devices to amplify the potential damage incurred by any single attacker. We introduce co-location edges, authenticated records that attest to the one-time physical co-location of a pair of mobile devices. The creation of co-location edges can be triggered opportunistically by the mapping service, e.g. Waze. Over time, co-location edges combine to form large proximity graphs, network structures that attest to physical interactions between devices. Since ghost-riders cannot physically interact with real devices, they cannot form direct edges with real devices, only indirectly through a small number of real devices operated by the attacker. Thus, the edges between an attacker and the rest of the network are limited by the number of real physical devices she has, regardless of how many ghost riders are under her control. This reduces the problem of detecting ghost riders to a community detection problem on the proximity graph 2 .
• We describe techniques to create light-weight ghost riders, virtual vehicles emulated by client-side scripts, through reverse-engineering of the Waze app's communication protocol with the server.
• We identify a new privacy attack that allows ghost riders to virtually follow and track individual Waze users in real-time, and describe techniques to produce precise, robust location updates.
• We propose and evaluate defenses against ghost riders, using proximity graphs constructed with edges representing authenticated co-location events between pairs of devices. Since co-location can only occur between pairs of physical devices, proximity graphs limit the number of edges between real devices and ghost riders, thus isolating groups of ghost riders and making them detectable using community-detection algorithms.
While our experiments and defenses are designed with Waze (and crowdsourced maps) in mind, most of our results generalize to the general class of location-based mobile apps. With some modifications, our techniques can be applied to services ranging from Foursquare and Yelp to Uber and Yik Yak, allowing attackers to cheaply emulate numerous virtual devices and forge their locations to overwhelm these systems. Thankfully, we believe our proposed defenses can be extended to these services as well. We discuss broader implications of our work in Section 8.
WAZE BACKGROUND
Waze is a popular GPS-based navigation application on smartphones with more than 50 million users as of June 2013 [19] . Waze leverages crowdsourced data gathered from its user community, and collects the GPS of users' devices to estimate real-time traffic. It also allows users to report on-road events such as accidents, road closures and police vehicles, as well as curating points of interest, editing roads, and even updating local fuel prices. Waze was acquired by Google in June 2013, and some features, e.g., crowdsourced road events, have been integrated into Google Maps [20] . Next, we briefly describe key functionality in Waze as context for our work, focusing on trip navigation, crowdsourced user reports and social interactions between drivers. Trip Navigation. This is Waze's main feature: assisting users to find the best route to their destination and turn-by-turn navigation. Waze generates aggregated real-time traffic updates using GPS data from its users, and optimizes user routes both during trip planning and during navigation. If and when traffic congestions is detected, Waze automatically re-routes users towards an alternative.
Crowdsourced User Reports.
Waze users can generate realtime event reports on their routes to inform others about ongoing incidents. Events range from accidents to road closures, hazards, and even police speed traps. Each report can also include a short note with a photo or more details. The event shows up on the map of users driving towards the reported location. As users get close, Waze pops up a window to let the user "say thanks," or report the event is "not there." Waze merges multiple reports of the same event type at/near the same location into a single event.
Social Function.
To increase user engagement, Waze supports simple social interactions. Users can see avatars and locations of nearby users. Clicking on a user's avatar shows more detailed user information, including nickname, ranking (based on user's contribution to Waze), and traveling speed. Also, users can send messages and chat with nearby users. This social function gives users the sense of a large community. Users can elevate their rankings in the community by contributing and receiving "thanks" from others.
MANIPULATING THE CROWDSOURC-ING MAP
In this section, we describe attacks to manipulate Waze map by generating false road events and fake traffic congestion. Since Waze relies on real-time map information for trip planning and route selection, these attacks can greatly influence user's routing decisions. Attackers can attack specific users by forging congestion to force automatic rerouting on their trips. The attack is possible because Waze has no reliable authentication on user reported data, such as their device GPS.
Next, we describe the basic mechanisms and resources needed to launch attacks, followed by controlled experiments on two attacking scenarios to understand their feasibility and limits. One attack aims to create fake road events at arbitrary locations, and the other seeks to generate fake traffic hotspots to disrupt user routing. Finally, we describe the impact of attacks to end-users and other dependent services (e.g., Google Maps).
Basic Attack Mechanisms
To launch significant attacks against crowdsourced maps such as Waze, attackers must achieve three requirements: gain automated control of devices to run the Waze app; control the device GPS and simulate device movements (e.g., car driving slowly); have easy access to multiple such devices. These requirements can be achieved by using widely available mobile device emulators that run on computers.
Most mobile emulators run a full OS (e.g., Android, iOS) down to the kernel level, and simulate hardware features such as camera, SDCard, GPS. We choose the GenyMotion Android emulator [2] for its performance and reliability. Attackers can automatically control the GenyMotion emulator via scripts using Monkeyrunner [3] . They can generate user actions on Waze such as clicking buttons and typing text, and feed pre-designed GPS sequences to the emulator (through a command line interface) to simulate location positioning and device movement. By controlling the timing of the GPS updates, they can simulate any "movement speed" of the virtual devices.
Next, we use these mechanisms to implement practical attacks to understand the feasibility and limits of such attacks. We take all possible precautions to ensure that our experiments will not bring any negative impact to Waze server or users. In particular, we run experiments at times and locations where user population density is lowest, and use frequent scans to ensure no Waze users are within range of our experiments.
Generating Fake Events
Using the above mechanisms, attackers can generate fake events (or alerts) at any location by setting fake GPS on their virtual devices. This includes any events supported by Waze such as accident, police, hazards, and road closures. These can seriously confuse (or distract) other Waze users on the road.
A single emulator can generate any event at arbitrary locations on the map. We validate this via experiments on a variety of unoccupied roads, including highways, local and rural roads (50+ locations, 3 repeated tests each). After creation, the fake event stays on the map for about 30 minutes. When other users drive by, they have the option to report the event is gone. We find that it takes two consecutive "not there" (without any "thanks" in between) to delete the event. This means an active attacker can ensure her event persists by occasionally driving other virtual devices to the region and "thanking" the original attacker for the event report.
Congestion and Traffic Routing
A more serious attack targets Waze's real-time trip routing function. Since route selection in Waze relies on predicted trip time, attackers can influence routes by creating "fake" traffic hotspots at specific locations. This can be done by configuring a group of virtual vehicles to travel slowly on a chosen road segment.
We use controlled experiments to answer two questions. First, under what conditions can attackers successfully create traffic hotspots? Second, how long can an artificial traffic hotspot last? We select three low-traffic roads in the state of Texas that are representative of three popular road types based on their speed limit-Highway (65 mph), Local (45 mph) and Residential (25 mph). We choose roads and hours of the day with the lowest traffic volumes, to avoid real users. We constantly scan for real users in the experimental region, and reset/terminate experiments if users enter an area with ongoing experiments. Across all experiments, only 2 tests were terminated due to arrival of real users. Finally, we perform spot sanity checks with different road types and hours of the day to ensure they are not significant factors.
Creating Traffic Hotspots.
Our experiment shows that it only takes one slow moving car to create a traffic congestion area. There are no real Waze users around, and one of our virtual vehicles provides the only input to Waze. Waze displays a red overlay on the road to indicate traffic congestion (Figure 1, right) . We find that different road types have different congestion thresholds, and the threshold is strongly correlated to the speed limit. Specifically, the congestion thresholds for Highway, Local and Residential roads are 40mph, 20mph and 15mph, respectively.
To understand if this is generalizable, we repeat our tests on other unoccupied roads in different states and countries. We picked 18 roads in five states in the US (CO, MO, NM, UT, MS) and British Columbia, Canada. In each region, we select three roads with different speed limits (highway, local and residential). We find consistency: a single virtual vehicle can always generate a traffic hotspot; and the congestion thresholds were consistent across different roads of the same speed limit. Outvoting Real Users.
Generating traffic hotspot in practical scenarios faces a challenge from real Waze users who drive at noncongested speeds: they must "convince" the server there's a stream of slow speed traffic on the road even as real users tell the server otherwise. We need to understand how Waze aggregated multiple inputs to estimate traffic speed.
We perform an experiment to infer this aggregation function used by Waze. We create two groups of virtual vehicles: Ns slowdriving cars with speed Ss, and N f fast-driving cars with speed S f ; and they all pass the target location at the same time. We study the congestion reported by Waze to infer the aggregation function. Note that the server-estimated traffic speed is visible on the map only if we formed a traffic hotspot. We achieve this by setting the speed tuple (Ss, S f ) to (10mph, 30mph) for Highway, (5, 15) for Local and (5, 10) for Residential, and vary Ns and N f .
As shown in Figure 2 , when we vary the ratio of slow cars over fast cars (Ns:N f ), the Waze server produces different final traffic speeds. We observe that Waze does not simply compute an "average" speed over all the cars. Instead, it uses a weighted average with higher weight on the majority cars' speed. We infer an aggregation function as follows:
, and Smax is the speed of the group with Nmax cars. As shown in Figure 2 , our function can predict Waze's aggregate traffic speed accurately. The function produces accurate predictions for all different types of roads in our test. For validation purposes, we run another set of experiments by raising S f to a higher value above hotspot threshold (65mph, 30mph and 20mph respectively on three roads). We can still form traffic hotspots by using more slow-driving cars (Ns > N f ), and our function can still predict the traffic speed accurately.
The weighted average method to aggregate traffic speed is intuitive, and a reasonable choice for any crowdsourced map service. The resulting implication is general: attackers can form traffic hotspots as long as their slow-driving virtual vehicles outnumber real vehicles on a given road segment. Conversely, they can "hide" a real traffic jam by driving multiple virtual vehicles at high speeds through the congested area. We will present more details on how to create large numbers of virtual vehicles later in §4. Long-Lasting Traffic Congestion. Next, we examine how long will artificial congestion events stay to impact users. Our tests show a traffic congestion hotspot will last around 25-30 minutes if no other cars drive by. And once aggregate speed normalizes above congestion levels, the congestion event will be dismissed within 2-5 minutes.
To maintain a long-lasting virtual traffic jam that resists input from legitimate drivers, the attacker simply keeps sending more slow-driving vehicles to the congestion area. We perform a simple, 50-minute long experiment where 3 virtual vehicles create a persistent congestion area by driving slowly through an area, and then looping back to the traffic hotspot. Meanwhile, 2 other virtual cars emulate legitimate drivers that pass by at high speed every 10 minutes. Figure 3 shows the displayed aggregate speed on the road over time, and how easy it is to maintain persistent traffic hotspots.
Impact on End Users
Next we evaluate the impact of both attacks on end users. We focus on how fake events and traffic congestions impact users' routing and navigation, and the potential impact on other services such as Google Maps. User Routing and Navigation.
Like many navigation apps, Waze uses real-time traffic data to optimize user routing. When planning a trip, Waze estimates end-to-end travel time and recommends the fastest route. Once the driver is on the road, Waze continuously estimates the travel time, and re-routes the user if the current route becomes congested. An attacker can place fake traffic hotspots on the original route, forcing Waze to reroute users to a detour road of the attacker's choice. For example, urban residents who have been complaining about the drive-through traffic in their neighborhood [36] , now can use this method to detour the traffic out of their residential area. Attackers can even create real world traffic jams by rerouting many cars to the same detour area. Note that when users are driving, rerouting happens in the background without their knowledge.
We show a simple example in Figure 1 . Waze picks the fastest route for a given destination. After the attacker creates a fake traffic jam on the route, Waze reroutes the user to another road. While congestion alone does not trigger rerouting, rerouting occurs when the estimated travel time through the current (congested) route goes above the estimated time through a detour route. This applies uniformly to all three major road types.
In contrast, fake events do not directly impact Waze's routing algorithm, only how users perceive the route. For instance, when users are planning trips, Waze will show a list of available routes together with a preview of all events on each route. At this point, certain events such as "road closure" or "police trap" could affect user's routing decisions, but not Waze's routing algorithm. Impact on Google Maps.
Since Waze's acquisition by Google in 2013, their data can potentially impact the 1 billion users on Google Maps [35] . We test and find that artificial congestion hotspots do not appear on Google Maps and have no impact on Google Maps routes. However, certain fake events generated on Waze are displayed on Google Maps without any verification and hence will affect Google Maps. For this we test all event types, and find that Google Maps only displays certain events, including "accidents", "construction" and "objects on road," while ignoring events like "police speed trap" and "road camera". Finally, event updates on Waze and Google Maps are synchronized, with only a 2-minute delay before new Waze events appear on Google Maps. Events persist for similar time periods on the two services. While it is unclear if Google Maps will integrate more Waze data in the future, Waze events do already have a defined impact on Google Maps users.
Summary.
We show that crowdsourced maps like Waze are highly vulnerable to data manipulation. We find that Waze takes in any user reported data (e.g., GPS) without verification. By exploiting this vulnerability, attackers can create fake traffic hotspots and misleading events at any location on the map, and use them to launch physical attacks on real users. This vulnerability not only impacts Waze users but also potentially propagates to other dependent services like Google Maps.
SYBIL ATTACKS
So far, we have demonstrated the feasibility of manipulating the Waze map using emulators to create "virtual vehicles." However, to really generate high impact, an attacker needs a much larger group of virtual vehicles (or Sybils [16] ) under her control. In this section, we describe techniques to produce light-weight virtual vehicles in Waze, and explore the scalability of the group-based attacks. We refer to large groups of virtual vehicles as "ghost riders" for two reasons. First, they are easy to create en masse, and can travel in packs to generate maximum impact. They can outvote real users and create coordinated actions to generate more complex events, e.g., persistent traffic congestion. Second, as we describe in §5, they can make themselves invisible to nearby vehicles. Factors Limiting Sybil Creation. We start by looking at the potential bottlenecks of the large-scale Sybil attacks on crowdsourced map services. First, users' accounts do not pose a challenge, since account registration can be fully automated. For our experiments, we wrote a single-threaded Monkeyrunner script, which automatically registered 1000 fake accounts in a day. In practice, attackers can create arbitrary number of accounts 3 . The real challenge is the number of vehicles that can be emulated simultaneously. Even though emulators like GenyMotion are already light-weighted, each instance still takes significant computational resources. For example, a MacBookPro with 8G of RAM only supports 10 simultaneous instances of the emulator.
To increase the number of virtual vehicles by orders of magnitude, attackers need a more light-weight way to emulate Waze clients. One promising direction is to reverse engineer the communication APIs used by the app, and replace emulators with lightweighted scripts (e.g., python) that mimic the API calls. To understand the communication APIs (between a Waze app and its servers), we need to intercept the app's network traffic. We show that this is feasible even when Waze traffic is TLS/SSL encrypted. Reverse Engineering Waze APIs.
The Waze app uses HTTPS to communicate with the server, so API details cannot be directly observed by capturing network traffic. However, an attacker can still intercept HTTPS traffic, by setting up a proxy [1] between her own phone and Waze server as man-in-the-middle [40, 9] . As shown in Figure 4 , an attacker needs to pre-install the proxy server's root Certificate Authorities (CA) to her own phone as "trusted CA." After that, the proxy can present self-signed certificates to the phone claiming to be the Waze server. The Waze app on the phone will trust the proxy (since certificate is signed by "trusted CA"), and establish HTTPS connections with the proxy using proxy's public key. On the proxy side, the attacker can decrypt the traffic using proxy's private key. The proxy forwards the traffic from the phone to Waze server and vice versa, and extracts the set of API calls used by Waze from the plain text traffic.
Fundamentally, hiding API calls from attackers using traffic encryption is very difficult, because the attacker has significant control over the entire communication process, including the phone, the app binary, and the proxy as man-in-the-middle. A known countermeasure is certificate pinning [18] , which seeks to spot rogue root CA certificates by embedding a copy of the server certificate within the app. When the app makes HTTPS requests, it validates the server-provided certificate with its known copy before establishing connections. However, dedicated attackers can extract and replace the embedded certificate by disassembling the app binary or attaching the app to a debugger [34, 17] . In a broader sense, it is very difficult to completely prevent reverse engineering of an app when the attacker has full access to the binary.
Scalability of Ghost Riders.
With knowledge of the Waze APIs, we build extremely light-weight Waze clients using python scripts, allocating one python thread for each client. Within each thread, we script the login process using a fake account, and maintain a live session by sending GPS coordinates periodically to Waze servers. Similarly, we can report fake events to Waze using the app APIs, thus completely replacing the emulator with python clients. Now we perform a simple test to examine the scalability of our ghost riders. We start 1000 virtual vehicles (1000 threads) on a Dell PowerEdge Server (Quad Core, 2GB RAM) running Linux. Each virtual vehicle emulates a Waze app by reporting GPS values to Waze servers once every 2 minutes. We run all virtual vehicles for 20 minutes, and monitor CPU, memory and bandwidth usage. We find running 1000 virtual devices only introduces a small overhead to the server: memory usage peaked at 11%; CPU usage peaked at 2% then stabilized at less than 1%. Finally, average bandwidth usage was 418.6 Kbps. The results show that serious attackers can launch massive scale attacks with only modest resources. In practical terms, attackers could potentially overwhelm entire cities with hundreds of thousands of ghost riders.
Finally, we seek to confirm the real functionality and impact of our ghost riders using experiments. We chose a secluded highway in rural Texas, and used 1000 virtual vehicles (hosted on a single server) to generate a highly congested traffic hotspot. Our experiment occurred in the middle of the night after scans showed no Waze users within miles of our test area. We positioned 1000 ghost riders one after another, and drove them slowly at 15 mph along the highway, looping them back every 15 minutes for an entire hour. As expected, the congestion hotspot was reported by Waze to our vehicles 5 minutes after our test began, and stayed on the map during the entire test period. No problems were observed during our test, and tests to generate fake events (accidents etc.) also proceeded without complications.
USER TRACKING ATTACK
Next, we describe a new attack on user privacy, where virtual vehicles can track Waze users continuously without risking detection themselves. By exploiting a key social functionality in Waze, attackers can remotely follow (or stalk) any individual user in real time. This is possible with single device emulation, but greatly amplified with the help of large groups of ghost riders, possibly tracking large user populations simultaneously and putting user (location) privacy at great risk. While users can go "invisible," they forfeit the ability to generate reports or message other users. Google/Waze also resets this property each time the app is opened.
We start by examining the feasibility (and key enablers) of this attack. We then present a simple but highly effective tracking algorithm that follows individual users in real time, which we have validated using real life experiments (with ourselves as the targets).
Feasibility of User Tracking
As a social navigation app, a key feature in Waze allows users to socialize with others on the road. Each user sees on her app screen icons representing the locations of nearby users, and can chat or message with them through the app. Leveraging this feature, an attacker can pinpoint any victim who has the Waze app running on her phone. By constantly "refreshing" the app screen (issuing an update query to the server), an attacker can query the victim's GPS location from Waze in real time 4 . To understand this capability, we perform detailed measurements on Waze to evaluate the efficiency and precision of user tracking. This includes the amount of overhead required to query (and thus track) a target, temporal granularity and coverage. Tracking via User Query.
The attacker tracks a target user by querying Waze continuously until locating the victim. After analyzing Waze app traffic to servers, we discovered this is done using a core API function: a client queries the server with its GPS coordinates and a rectangular "search area"; the server returns a list of users located in the specified area, including their userID, nickname, account creation time, GPS coordinates and the timestamp of the GPS report. This search area can be set to any location on the map, and does not depend on the requester's location. This allows the attacker to scan users at any location without even being there virtually. This, combined with the fact that the API can be replayed using python scripts, allows the attacker to issue large volumes of queries remotely without being seen by the tracked user. Overcoming Downsampling.
The above user query faces a challenge, because Waze responds to each query with an "incomplete" set of users, i.e., up to 20 users per query regardless of the search area size. This limit (or downsampled result) is necessary to prevent flooding the app screen with too many user icons. Yet it significantly limits an attacker's ability to follow a moving target.
One way to address this downsampling is to repeatedly query the system until locating the victim. Intuitively, if the sampling process is random, then repeated queries will eventually recover the complete set of users. To examine the level of randomness, we perform query measurements on four test areas (of different sizes between 3 × 4 mile 2 and 24 × 32 mile 2 ) in the downtown area of a large metropolitan city (City A, with 10 million residents as of 2014). For each area, we issue 400 queries within 10 seconds, and examine the number of unique users returned by all the queries. Since Waze applies a rate limit of 2 queries per second per-account, we use 20 accounts to perform this experiment. Results in Figure 5 show that the number of unique users reported converges after 150-250 queries for the three small search areas (≤ 12 × 16 mile 2 ). For the area of size 24×32 mile 2 , more than 400 queries are required to reach convergence. These results confirm that repeated queries can retrieve a (near) complete set of Waze users in a search area. This technique obviously has its limits, and the number of queries to retrieve a near-complete user set increases superlinearly with the area size. A simple solution is to divide an area into smaller, fixed size partitions and assign different accounts to query each partition's users in parallel.
We also observe that user lists returned by different Waze servers had only a partial overlap (roughly 20% of users from each server were unique to that server). This "inconsistency" across servers is caused by synchronization delay among the servers. Each user only sends its GPS coordinates to a single server which takes 2-5 minutes to propagate to other servers. Therefore, a complete user set requires queries to cover all Waze servers. At the time of our experiments, the number of Waze servers could be traced through app traffic and could be covered by a moderate number of querying accounts.
Finally, we confirm the uniform-randomness of downsampling by comparing our measurement results to a mathematical model that projects the statistics of query results assuming uniform-random sampling. Consider total M users in the search area. The probability of a user x getting sampled in a single round of query (20 users per query) is P (x) = 20 M . Over N queries, the number of appearances per user should follow a Binomial Distribution [24] with mean N · 20 M . Figure 7 plots the measured user appearances for the four servers on the 6 × 8 mile 2 area with N = 100. The measured statistics follow the projected Binomial Distribution (the measured mean values closely match the theoretical expectation). This confirms that the downsampling is indeed random.
Temporal Precision and Coverage.
After analyzing Waze network traffic, we found that each active Waze app updates its GPS coordinates to a server every 2 minutes, regardless of the user's mobility status, e.g., driving or stationary. Even when running in the background, the app reports GPS every 5 minutes. This means that as long as the Waze app is open (even if it's left running in the background), user's location will be continuously updated to Waze (and any interested attacker).
So far, our analysis indicates that an attacker can easily track an individual user during a single Waze session. But to perform prolonged tracking, the attacker will need a persistent ID associated to the target user. The current userID field is not reliable-Waze assigns a random ID to a user upon login, but releases the ID when the user kills the app. Instead, we find that a "account creation time" field in the metadata can serve as a user's persistent ID. First, it remains the same across the user's different sessions. Second, the precision of this "creation time" is down to second, which has a very low probability to collide with other users in the same geographic area. This allows the attacker to persistently track a target user for months or years.
To prevent prolonged tracking, hypothetically, the future Waze app can remove the "account creation time" field from meta data. In practice, however, an attacker can overcome this restriction by analyzing the victim's mobility pattern. For example, the attacker can identify a set of locations where the victim has visited frequently or stayed during the past session, mapping to home or workplace. Then attacker assigns a ghost rider to persistently monitor the areas, and re-identify the victim once her icon shows up in one of these favorite locations, i.e., office or home.
Stealth Mode.
It is important to note that the attacker will remain invisible to the target user. This is because queries on a specific geographic area can be done remotely by Sybils (with arbitrary locations) scrolling the screen window over the search area. The attacker can also enable the "invisible" option, so that its location is not visible to other nearby users.
We also note that disabling these features still does not make the tracker visible. Waze only updates each user's "nearby" screen every 2 minutes (while sending its own GPS update to the servers). Thus a tracker can "pop into" the target's region, query for the target, and then move to a location out of the target's observable range, all before the target has a chance to update and observe the attacker.
Real-time Individual User Tracking
After explaining the basic elements and properties of user tracking, we now describe details of tracking individual users in realtime, and the experiments we performed (on ourselves) to evaluate its effectiveness.
The goal of the attack is to build a detailed trace of a target user's movements, by following him wherever he goes. The attacker first bootstraps by identifying the target's icon on the map. This can be done by identifying the target's icon while confirming her physical presence at a time and location, i.e., out at lunch with coworkers or within line of sight of the attacker. The attacker centers its search area on the victim's location, and issues a large number of queries (using Sybil accounts) until it captures the next GPS report from the victim. If the victim is moving, the attacker moves the search area along the victim's direction of movement and repeats the process to get a location update. The attacker can thus remotely stalk the victim without being noticed.
Experiments.
To evaluate its effectiveness, we performed experiments by tracking one of our own Android smartphones. Using the OSRM tool [4] , we generate detailed GPS traces of two driving trips, one in the downtown area of a metropolitan city (City A), and one along an interstate highway (Highway B). To emulate real life driving, we fed each trace into the victim smartphone based on the average driving speed reported by Google Map at the time of the experiment, which were then reported to Waze. We instructed the attacker to run a python script that controls 20 Sybil accounts to query Waze simultaneously. We configured the search area to a rectangle of size 6 × 8 mile 2 , which is sufficient to track the subsequent GPS update of a fast-driving car (up to 160mph given the GPS report frequency of once per 2 minutes). Both experiments were during morning traffic hours, and we logged both the network traffic of the target phone and the query data retrieved by the attacker. Results. Table 1 lists the tracking results for the two driving routes while Figure 8 presents a graphical view of the City A result. For both routes (35-40 minutes in length), the attacker can consistently follow the victim to his destination, although the attacker fails to capture 1-2 reported GPS points out of 18-20 total GPS points. For the City A route, the tracking delay, i.e., the time spent to capture the subsequent GPS update of the victim, is larger (averaging 43s rather than 9s). This is because the downtown area has a higher Waze user density, and thus required more rounds of queries to locate the victim.
Our experiments represent two highly challenging (i.e., worst case) scenarios for the attacker. The City A downtown is highly crowded with a large Waze user density, making it challenging to identify the victim in real time with downsampling. In the highway scenario, the victim travels in a high speed (roughly 60mph), putting a stringent time requirement on the tracking speed, i.e., the attacker must capture the victim before he leaves the search area. The success of both experiments confirms the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed attack.
Another important observation is that the attacker obtained the exact GPS coordinates that the victim's phone sent to Waze servers. This indicates that Waze servers do not pre-process user GPS reports, e.g., by adding noise, but use them directly to answer queries. Since each user reports GPS every 2-5 minutes, the attacker can easily track the victim at a fine granularity in time and space.
Summary
We have presented a simple but highly effective attack that can track Waze users in real time. Intuitively, Waze can prevent this attack by not displaying user icon on the map (app screen). But doing so destroys the "social" component that is Waze's most compelling feature. This motivates us to design attack countermeasures that Waze can deploy without affecting its existing features.
DEFENDING AGAINST GHOST RIDERS
In this section, we propose defense mechanisms to significantly limit the impact of the attacks. While individual devices can inflict limited damage, an attacker's ability to control a large number of virtual vehicles at low cost elevates the severity of the attack in both quantity and quality. Our priority, then, is to restrict the number of ghost riders available to each attacker, thus increasing the cost per "vehicle" and reducing potential damage.
The most intuitive approach is perform strong location authentication, so that attackers must use real devices physically located at the actual locations reported. This would make ghost riders as expensive to operate as real devices. Unfortunately, existing methods do not extend well to our context. Some proposals solely rely on trusted infrastructures (e.g., wireless access points) to verify the physical presence of devices in close proximity [29, 37] . However, this requires large scale retrofitting of cellular celltowers or installation of new hardware, neither of which is practical at large geographic scales. Others propose to embed tamperproof location hardware on mobile devices [31, 38] , which incurs high cost per user, and would only work well if enforced across all devices. For our purposes, we need a scalable approach that works with current hardware, without incurring costs on mobile users or the map service (Waze).
Sybil Detection via Proximity Graph
Instead of optimizing per-device location authentication, our proposed defense is a Sybil detection mechanism based on the novel concept of proximity graph. Specifically, we leverage physical proximity between real devices to create co-location edges, which act as secure attestations of shared physical presence. In a proximity graph, nodes are Waze devices (uniquely identified by an account username and password on the server side). They perform secure peer-to-peer location authentication with the Waze app running in the background. An edge is established if the proximity authentication is successful.
Because Sybil devices are scripted software, they are highly unlikely to come into physical proximity with real devices. A Sybil device can only form co-location edges with other Sybil devices (with coordination by the attacker) or the attacker's own physical devices. The resulting graph should have only very few (or no) edges between virtual devices and real users (other than the attacker). Leveraging prior work on Sybil detection in social networks, groups of Sybils can be characterized by the few "attack edges" connecting them to the rest of the graph, making them identifiable through community-detection algorithms [47] .
We use a very small number of trusted nodes only to bootstrap trust in the graph. We assume a small number of infrastructure access points are known to Waze servers, e.g., hotels and public WiFi networks associated with physical locations stored in IP-location databases (used for geolocation by Apple and Google). Waze also can work with merchants that own public WiFi access points (e.g., Starbucks). These infrastructures are trusted nodes, and any Waze device that communicates with Waze server under their IPs (and reports a GPS location consistent with the IP) automatically creates a new co-location edge to the trusted node.
Our Sybil defense contains two key steps. First, we build a proximity graph based on the "random encounters" between Waze users. This step requires a reliable method to authenticate the physical proximity of devices ( §6.2). Second, we detect Sybils based on the result of trust propagation in proximity graph. We apply existing graph-based Sybil detection algorithms ( §6.3), and present a simulation-driven evaluation ( §7). To build the proximity graph, we first need a reliable method to verify the physical colocation of mobile devices. We cannot rely on GPS reports since attackers can forge arbitrary GPS coordinates, or Bluetooth based device ranging [52] because the coverage is too short (<10 meters) for vehicles. Instead, we consider a challengebased proximity authentication method, which leverages the limited transmission range of WiFi radios.
Peer-based Proximity Authentication

WiFi Tethering Challenge.
We use the smartphone's WiFi radio to implement a proximity challenge between two Waze devices. Because WiFi radios have limited ranges (<250 meters for 802.11n [45] )), two Waze devices must be in physical proximity to complete the challenge. Specifically, we (or the Waze server) instruct one device to enable WiFi tethering and broadcast beacons with an SSID provided by the Waze server, i.e., a randomly generated, time-varying bit string. The second device proves its proximity to the first device by returning the SSID value heard over the air to the Waze server.
The key concerns of this approach are whether the WiFi link between two vehicles is stable/strong enough to complete the challenge, and whether the separation distance is long enough for our needs. This concern is valid given the high moving speed, potential signal blockage from vehicles' metal components, and the low transmit power of smartphones. We explore these issues with detailed measurements on real mobile devices.
First, we perform measurements on stationary vehicles to study the joint effect of blockage and limited mobile transmit power. We put two Android phones into two cars (with windows and doors closed), one running WiFi tethering to broadcast beacons and the other scanning for beacons. Figure 9 plots the WiFi beacon strength at different separation distances. We see that the above artifacts make the signal strength drop to -100 dBm before the distance reaches 250 meters. In the same figure, we also plot the probability of successful beacon decoding (thus challenge completion) across 400 attempts within 2 minutes. It remains 100% when the two cars are separated by <80 meters, and drops to zero at 160 meters.
Next, we perform driving experiments on a highway at normal traffic hours in the presence of other vehicles. The vehicles travel at speeds averaging 65 mph. During driving, we are able to vary the distance between the two cars, and use recorded GPS logs to calculate the separation distance. Figure 10 shows that while WiFi signal strength fluctuates during our experiments, the probability of beacon decoding remains very high 98% when the separation is less than 80 meters but drops to <10% once the two cars are more than 140 meters apart.
Overall, the results suggest the proposed WiFi tethering challenge is a reliable method for proximity authentication for our system. In practice, Waze can start the challenge when detecting the two vehicles are within the effective range, e.g., 80 meters. Since the WiFi channel scan is fast, e.g., 1-2 seconds to do a full channel scan in our experiments, this challenge can be accomplished quickly with minimum energy cost on mobile devices. Finally, it is easy to implement this scheme using existing APIs to control WiFi radio to open tethering (setWifiApEnabled API in Android).
Constructing Proximity Graphs.
In a proximity graph, each node is a Waze device, and an edge indicates the two users come into physical proximity, e.g., 80 meters, within a predefined time window. The resulting graph is undirected but weighted based on the number of times the two users have encountered. Using weighted graph makes it harder for Sybils to blend into the normal user region. Intuitively, real users will get more weights on their edges as they use Waze over time. For attackers, in order to blend in the graph, they need to build more weighted attack edges to real users (higher costs).
To reduce the overhead for Waze and end-users, the Waze server does not need to trigger colocation authentication every time two users are in close proximity. Since the process is triggered by the Waze server, Waze can use one device's WiFi tethering to authenticate multiple other devices within a fixed area. This reduces the general overhead of colocation authentication, and also avoids performance issues like wireless interference in areas with high user density. In practice, Waze can adjust the "frequency" of authentication to control the overall graph (edge) density, and to ensure graph connectivity.
Graph-based Sybil Detection
We apply graph-based Sybil detection algorithms to detect Sybils in Waze proximity graph. Graph-based Sybil detectors [49, 50, 47, 14, 10] were originally proposed in social networks. They all rely on the key assumption that Sybils have difficulty to form edges with real users, which results in a sparse cut between the Sybil and nonSybil regions in the social graph. Because of the limited number of "attack edges" between Sybils and non-Sybils, a random walk from non-Sybil region has a higher landing probability to land on a nonSybil node than a Sybil node. Our proximity graph holds the same assumption that these algorithms require-with the WiFi proximity authentication, it's difficult for Sybil devices (ghost riders) to build attack edges to real Waze users. SybilRank. Among available algorithms, we use SybilRank [10] . Compared to its counterparts (SybilGuard [49] , SybilLimit [50] and SybilInfer [14] ), SybilRank achieves higher accuracy at a lower computational cost. At the high-level, its counterparts need to perform actual random walks, which is very costly and yet often gives incomplete views of the graph. Instead, SybilRank uses power iteration [27] to compute the random walk landing probability for all nodes. This significantly boosts the algorithm accuracy and speed. Furthermore, SybilRank has a better tolerance on community structures in the non-Sybil region (for using multiple trusted nodes), making it more suitable for real-world graphs.
To provide context for our subsequent discussions, we briefly describe how SybilRank works and refer readers to [10] for more details. SybilRank ranks the nodes based on how likely they are Sybils. The algorithm starts with multiple trusted nodes in the graph. It iteratively computes the landing probability for short random walks (originated from trusted nodes) to land on all other nodes. The landing probability is normalized by the node's degree, which acts as the trust score for ranking. Intuitively, short random walks from trusted nodes are very unlikely to traverse the few attack edges to reach Sybil nodes, thus the ranking scores of Sybils should be lower. For Sybil detection, Waze can set a cutoff threshold on the trust score, and label the tail of the ranked list as Sybils.
The original SybilRank works on unweighted social graphs. We modified it to work on our weighted proximity graph: when a node propagates trust (or performs random walks) to its neighbors, instead of splitting the trust equally, it distributes proportionally based on the edge weights. This actually makes it harder for Sybils to evade SybilRank-they will need to build more high-weight attack edges to real users to receive trust.
COUNTERMEASURE EVALUATION
We use simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed defense. We focus on evaluating the feasibility and cost for attackers to maintain a large number of Sybils after the Sybil detection is in place. We quantify the cost by the number of attack edges a Sybil must establish with real users. In practice, this translates into the effort taken to physically drive around and use physical devices (with WiFi radios) per Sybil to complete proximity authentication. In the following, we first describe our simulation setup, and then present the key findings and their implications on Waze.
Evaluation Setup
We first discuss how we construct a synthetic proximity graph for our evaluation, followed by the counter strategies taken by attackers to evade detection. Finally, we describe the evaluation metrics for Sybil detection.
Simulating Proximity Graphs.
We use well-known models on human encountering to create synthetic proximity graphs. This is because, to the best of our knowledge, there is no public per-user mobility dataset with sufficient scale and temporal coverage to support our evaluation. Also, directly crawling large-scale, per-user mobility trace from Waze can lead to questionable privacy implications, and thus we exclude this option.
Existing literatures [32, 13, 43, 22, 28] all suggest that human (and vehicle) encounter patterns display strong scale-free and "smallworld" properties [6] . Thus we follow the methodology of [32] to simulate a power-law based encounter process among Waze users. Given a user population N , we first assign each user an encounter probability following a power-law distribution (α =2 based on the empirical values [32, 12] ). We then simulate user encounter over time, by adding edges to the graph based on the joint probability of the two nodes.
For our evaluation, we produce a proximity graph for N = 10000 normal users and use the snapshot when 99.9% of nodes are connected. Note that as the graph gets denser over time, it is harder for Sybils to blend into normal user regions. We use this graph to simulate the lower-bound performance of Sybil detection. Attacker Models. In the presence of Sybil detection, an attacker will try mixing their Sybils into the proximity graph. We consider the following strategies:
1. Single-Gateway -An attacker first takes one Sybil account (as the gateway) to build attack edges to normal users. Then the attacker connects the remaining Sybils to this gateway. In practice, this means that the attacker only needs to take one physical phone to encounter normal users. 2. Multi-Gateways -An attacker distributes the attack edges to multiple gateways, and then evenly spreads the other Sybils across the gateways. This helps the Sybils to blend in with normal users. The attacker pays an extra cost in terms of using multiple real devices to build attack edges.
The attacker also builds edges among its own Sybils. This incurs no additional cost since Sybils can easily collude to pass proximity authentication, but introduces key benefits. First, it makes Sybils' degree distribution appear more legitimate. Second, it can potentially increase Sybils' trust score: when a random walk reaches one Sybil node, its edges to the fellow Sybils help to sustain the random walk within the Sybil region and boost Sybils' trust score. In our simulation, we follow the scale-free distribution to add edges among Sybils, mimicking normal user region. Evaluation Metrics.
To evaluate Sybil detection efficacy, we use the standard false positive (negative) rate, and the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUC) used by SybilRank [10] . AUC represents the probability that SybilRank ranks a random Sybil node lower than a random non-Sybil node. Its value ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 means the ranking is perfect (all Sybils are ranked lower than non-Sybils), 0 means the ranking is always flipped, and 0.5 matches the result of random guessing. Compared to false positive (negative) rates, AUC is independent of the cutoff threshold, and thus comparable across experiment settings.
Results
Accuracy of Sybil Detection.
We assume the attacker seeks to embed 1000 Sybils into the proximity graph. We use either singleor multi-gateway approaches to build attack edges on the proximity graph by connecting Sybils to randomly chosen normal users. We then add edges between Sybil nodes, following the power-law distribution and producing an average weighted degree of either 5 or 10 (to emulate different Sybil subgraph density). We randomly select 10 trusted nodes to bootstrap trust for SybilRank and run it on the proximity graph. We repeat each experiment 50 times. Figure 11 shows that the Sybil detection mechanism is highly effective. For attackers of the single-gateway model, the AUC is very close to 1 (> 0.983), indicating Waze can identify almost all Sybils even after the attacker established a large number of attack edges, e.g., 50000. Meanwhile, the multi-gateway method helps attackers add "undetected" Sybils, but the number of gateways required is significant. For example, to maintain 1000 Sybils, i.e., by bringing down AUC to 0.5, the attacker needs at least 500 as gateways. In practice, this means wardriving with 500+ physical devices to meet real users, which is a significant overhead.
Interestingly, the 1000-gateway result (where every Sybil is a gateway) shows that, at certain point, adding more attack edges can actually hurt Sybils. This is potentially due to the fact that SybilRank uses node degree to normalize trust score. For gateways that connect to both normal users and other Sybils, the additional "trust" received by adding more attack edges cannot compensate the penalty of degree normalization.
For a better look at the detection accuracy, we convert the AUC in Figure 11 (b) to false positives (classifying real users as Sybils) and false negatives (classifying Sybils as real users). For simplicity, we set a cutoff value to mark the bottom 10% of the ranked nodes as Sybils. 5 As shown in Figure 13 , SybilRank is highly accurate to detect Sybils when the number of gateways is less than 100. Again 100 gateways incurs high cost in practice.
Next we quickly examine the impact of trusted nodes to Sybil detection. Figure 12 shows a small number of trusted node is enough to run SybilRank. Interestingly, adding more trusted nodes can slightly hurt Sybil detection, possibly because it gives the attacker (gateways) a higher chance to receive trust. In practice, multiple trusted nodes can help SybilRank overcome potential community structures in proximity graph (e.g., users of the same city form a cluster). So Waze should place trusted nodes accordingly to cover geographic clusters. Cost of Sybil Attacks. Finally, we infer the rough cost of attackers on implementing successful Sybil attacks. For this we look at the number of attack edges required to successfully embed a given number of Sybils. Our experiment assumes the attacker uses 500 gateways and builds power-law distributed inner connections with average degree=10. Figure 14 shows the number of attack edges required to achieve a specific AUC under SybilRank as a function of the target number of Sybils. We see that the attack edge count increases linearly with the Sybil count. The cost of Sybil attack is high: to maintain 3000 Sybils, the attacker must make 60,000 attack edges to keep AUC below 0.75, and spread these attack edges across 500 high-cost gateways.
Implications on Waze
The above results confirm that our Sybil detection method is highly effective. It significantly increases the cost (in terms of purchasing physical devices and performing physical driving) to lunch Sybil attacks. Also, SybilRank is highly scalable to handle the data of Waze. In fact, a social network with tens of millions of users has been running SybilRank on Hadoop to detect Sybils [10] . Integration with Other Methods. Sybil detection still has limitations. For example, it is still possible for attackers to configure a few real devices to report fake road events and GPS coordinates. So in addition to Sybil detection, Waze can incorporate other mechanisms to protect its users. We briefly describe a few key ideas, but leave the integration with our approach to future work.
First, Waze can check user's IP address to identify suspicious behaviors. For instance, when a user's GPS claims she is driving, Waze can examine whether the user's IP is a mobile IP that belongs to a valid cellular network carrier or a suspicious web proxy. However, this approach is ineffective if dedicated attackers route the attack traffic through a cellular data plan. Second, Waze can apply more strict rate limit per device. With that, attackers will need to run more Sybil devices to implement the same attack. Finally, Waze can adopt more strict verification steps on account registration. But this needs to be handled carefully, since it may also push away potential new users, which is a big loss for a crowdsourcing app that relies on user contributions. Also, SMS/email verification can be bypassed using disposable phone number /email services.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
While our experiments and defenses have focused strictly on the Waze application, our results are applicable to a wider range of mobile applications that rely on geolocation for user-contributed content and metadata. Examples include location based check-in and review services (Foursquare, Yelp), crowdsourced navigation systems (Waze, Moovit), crowdsourced taxi services (Uber, Lyft), mobile dating apps (Tinder, Bumble) and even anonymous mobile communities (Yik Yak, Whisper).
These systems face two common challenges that expose them to potential attacks. First, our efforts confirm that it is difficult for app developers to build a truly secure channel between the app and the server. There are numerous avenues for an attacker to reverseengineer and mimic an app's API calls, thereby creating "cheap" virtual devices and launching an effective Sybil attack [16] . Second, there are no deployed mechanisms to authenticate location data (e.g., GPS coordinates). Without a secure channel to the server and authenticated location, all of these mobile apps are vulnerable to automated attacks ranging from nuisance (prank calls to Uber) to malicious content attacks (large-scale rating manipulation on Yelp).
To validate our point, we run a quick empirical analysis on a broad class of mobile apps to understand how easy it is to reverseengineer their APIs and inject falsified data into the system. We pick one representative app from each category including Foursquare, Uber, Tinder and Yik Yak (an incomplete list). We find that, although all the listed apps use TLS/SSL to encrypt their communications with the servers, their detailed APIs can be fully exposed by the method in §4. For each app, we were able to build a lightweight client (virtual device) using python script, and feed arbitrary GPS to their key function calls. For example, with forged GPS values, a group of automated Foursquare clients can deliver large volumes of check-ins to a given venue without physically visiting it; On Uber, one can distributed many virtual devices over a large area as sensors, and passively monitor and track all drivers (and their passengers) within an area (see §5). Similarly for Yik Yak and Tinder, the virtual devices make it possible to perform wardriving in a given location area to post and collect anonymous Yik Yak messages or Tinder profiles. There are possible app-specific defenses, and we leave their design and evaluation to future work.
RELATED WORK Security in Location-based Services.
Location-based services face various threats, ranging from rogue users reporting fake GPS [11, 21] , to malicious parties compromising user privacy [15, 25, 26] . The lack of reliable authentication on user GPS enables different attacks to disrupt the system. For example, [11, 21] present an attack that generates fake Foursquare check-ins to gain monetary rewards (e.g., free drinks).
A related study on Waze [39] demonstrated that small-scale attacks can create traffic jams or track user icons, with up to 15 mobile emulators. Our work differs in two key aspects. First, we showed that it is possible to reverse engineer the server API, enabling light-weight Sybil devices (simple scripts) to replace fullstack emulators. This increase the scale of potential attacks by several orders of magnitude, to thousands of Waze clients per commodity laptop. The impact of thousands of virtual vehicles is qualitatively different from 10-15 smartphone simulators. As possible defenses, [39] cites known tools such as phone number/IP verification, or location authentication with cellular towers, which have limited applicability (see §6). In contrast, we propose and evaluate a novel techniques that uses robust proximity attestations to build a proximity graph, thereby detecting and constraining the impact of any virtual devices.
Recent proposals preserve user location privacy against service providers like Waze and Google. [23] uses zero-knowledge protocols to preserve user anonymity against Waze/Google servers, while maintaining user accountability. [8] applies differential privacy for the same purpose, while supporting aggregated traffic updates. Our work differs from them by focusing on attacks to the map service, where the adversary is a malicious third-party instead of Waze servers.
Mobile Location Authentication.
Defending against forged GPS is challenging. One solution is to enforce strong location authentication using trusted software/hardware modules on mobile devices. Recent works [31, 38] use Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) [5] to securely sign and certify sensing information (e.g., GPS reads). This is mainly used to prevent GPS spoofing, and is ineffective when attackers have physical access to the phone.
Others authenticate user locations using wireless infrastructures: WiFi APs [29, 37] , cellular base stations [29, 37] and femtocells [7] . Devices must come into physical proximity to these infrastructures to be authenticated. But it requires cooperation among a wide range of infrastructures (also modifications to their software/hardware), which is impractical for large-scale services like Waze. Our work only uses a small number of trusted infrastructures to bootstrap, and relies on peer-based trust propagation to achieve coverage.
Finally, researchers have proposed "peer-based" methods to authenticate co-located mobile devices [42, 48, 52, 30, 33] . We also use peer-based proximity authentication. Different from existing studies, we build proximity graphs for Sybil detection, instead of directly authenticating a device's physical location. Also, we choose WiFi radio for its range (100-250m) for vehicular scenarios, while most existing works use Bluetooth (<10m).
Graph-based Sybil Detection.
Graph-based Sybil detection has been studied in peer-to-peer networks [16] and recently in online social networks [10, 14, 46, 47, 50, 49] . They rely on the key assumption that Sybils have difficulty to build relationships (edges) with real users, and thus form a well-connected subgraph that has a small quotient-cut from the non-Sybil region. Our work constructs a proximity graph that holds the same assumption, and applies existing Sybil detection algorithms to locate ghost riders in Waze. Our work differs from [10] in the graph and the attack models.
CONCLUSION
We describe our efforts to identify and study a range of attacks on crowdsourced map services. We identify a range of single and multi-user attacks, and describe techniques to build and control groups of virtual vehicles (ghost riders) to amplify these attacks. Our work shows that today's mapping services are highly vulnerable to software agents controlled by malicious users, and both the stability of these services and the privacy of millions of users are at stake. While our study and experiments focus on the Waze system, we believe the large majority of our results can be generalized to crowdsourced apps as a group. We propose and validate a suite of techniques that help services build proximity graphs and use them to effectively detect Sybil devices.
Throughout this work, we have taken active steps to isolate our experiments and prevent any negative consequence on real Waze users. Our work is IRB approved and more details on IRB, ethics and disclosure is contained in Appendix A.
